A message arrives from your CEO asking for gift cards. Another from a supplier with new bank details. A third from Microsoft saying your password expires today. All three are fake, and all three work on busy people because they look normal and ask for speed.

You do not need to be technical to catch most of them. You need sixty seconds and five checks.

Why these messages get through

Email was not built to check who is writing. Microsoft's documentation on email authentication says that, by design, internet email makes no effort to confirm that a sender is who they claim to be. RFC 5322, the standard for the format of a message, makes the display name an optional phrase in front of the real address, which sits in angle brackets, and most inboxes show that phrase first.

SPF, DKIM and DMARC close part of that gap. SPF lists the servers allowed to send mail for a domain, DKIM adds a digital signature from the domain, and DMARC checks that those results line up with the domain in the From address and says what the domain owner wants done with failures. When a domain's DMARC policy is set to quarantine or reject, receiving systems that honor it can divert or refuse forgeries of that exact domain.

They do not stop a look-alike domain that a scammer registered and set up properly. Microsoft's anti-phishing documentation says impersonation can pass SPF, DKIM and DMARC when the attacker has created a lookalike domain and published valid DNS records.

That is why the human check still matters. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center logged 24,768 business email compromise complaints in 2025, with reported losses of just over $3 billion. Its 2025 annual report notes that chat generators can quickly write official-sounding emails that mimic a company's CEO, that voice cloning can be used to request wire payments, and that businesses reported more than $30 million in losses to business email compromise scams involving AI.

CISA makes a related point. Poor grammar and misspellings used to be a common sign, but in the era of artificial intelligence some phishing emails now have perfect spelling and grammar. The checks below look at things a scammer cannot polish.

Check one is the address behind the name

The display name is free text. Anyone can type "Jane Smith, CEO" into it. The address behind it is harder to fake. Tap or hover on the sender's name and read the actual address.

An address of jane@yourcompany.com is one thing. A message from jane.smith.ceo@gmail.com, or from jane@yourcompany-inc.com, is another. Look-alike domains are the most common trick: a letter swapped, a word added, .co instead of .com.

Read the domain slowly. Microsoft's list of phishing signs includes addresses changed just enough to look legitimate, with added numbers or changed letters, and CISA lists incorrect email addresses and links among its main signs. The FBI specifically advises verifying the sender's address when you read mail on a phone or other handheld device.

Here is where to find the address in the common apps:

  • In Outlook signed in with a work or school account, hover over the sender's name in the message list.
  • In Gmail on a computer, open the message and click the down arrow below the sender's name.
  • On a phone, do not act on the name alone, and if you cannot see the full address, check the message on a computer first.

Your mail system may flag a problem too. Outlook can show a question mark in the sender's photo when a message fails Microsoft's authentication checks, and an underlined "via" when the sending or signing domain differs from the domain in the From address. Gmail shows a question mark next to the sender's name when a message is not authenticated.

Neither mark proves a scam. Microsoft says not every message that fails authentication is malicious, and Google notes that authentication sometimes fails for real organizations that send to big groups, such as mailing lists. Microsoft adds that a question mark suddenly appearing on a sender who normally has none could be a sign the sender is being spoofed.

If your administrator has turned it on, Outlook also shows a line reading "You don't often get email from" followed by the address when a sender is new or rare. On a message claiming to be from your CEO or a long-standing supplier, that line is reason enough to stop.

Check two is the ask

Does it want money, gift cards, a password, a change to bank or payroll details, or a click to "verify" something? Those five asks cover nearly every scam. A real request for any of them can wait for a phone call.

Some asks arrive in disguise. Microsoft's guide to common phishing techniques describes an email about an outstanding invoice from a known vendor with a link to pay it, a request to update card details so an order can be delivered when you do not remember buying anything, and an attachment that asks you to sign in to an email or file-sharing site before you can open it. The first two are the money ask and the third is the password ask. Microsoft also notes that normal email does not ask you to enable macros, adjust security settings or install applications.

The gift-card version has a recognizable script. The Federal Trade Commission describes an unexpected text, email or call from your "boss" asking for an urgent favor: go to the store, buy gift cards and send the numbers on the back. Its advice is to check with your boss using a number or email address you know is real, not the one that contacted you, and it says plainly that only scammers ask for gift card numbers and the PIN.

The payroll version targets whoever runs payroll. The FBI has described spoofed emails that appear to come from employees and ask HR or payroll to change their direct deposit account, with the new details generally leading to a prepaid card. In a related scheme, criminals phish an employee's own payroll login, redirect the deposit and add rules that stop the employee from receiving alerts about the change.

Check three is the pressure

"Today." "Urgent." "I am in a meeting and cannot talk." "Do not tell anyone yet." Scams need speed because thinking kills them. Real colleagues can be called back.

Gmail's phishing guidance says scammers use emotion to try to get you to act without thinking, and CISA lists urgent or emotionally appealing language, especially claims of dire consequences for not responding immediately, among its main signs. Claims that someone cannot talk, or that you must tell no one, belong to the same pressure. Each one blocks the check that would expose the sender.

Check four is the link

Before clicking, hover over it or long-press it and read where it really goes. A link that says microsoft.com and goes to a string of random letters is the whole story. When in doubt, do not click at all. Open a new tab, type the site's address yourself, and sign in there.

Reading a web address takes one rule. Take the site name, which sits between the double slash at the start and the next single slash, and read it from right to left. The ending comes first, such as .com, .net or .co.uk, and the name just before it tells you who controls the whole address.

ICANN's guide to domain names shows the levels with whois.icann.org, where org is the top level, icann the second and whois the third, and it explains that whoever registers a domain can create names beneath it. So in microsoft.com.example.net, the words microsoft.com were created by whoever controls example.net, and that is who would receive your password.

QR codes in email are links you cannot hover over. The FTC warns that scammers hide harmful links in them, often with a story about a package they could not deliver or a problem with your account, and advises against scanning a QR code in an email or text you were not expecting. Microsoft notes that the trick moves you away from email link scanning and onto a phone, where the destination is harder to inspect before it opens.

Check five is the pattern

Does this person normally email you this way? Does your supplier normally change bank details by email with no call? Does Microsoft normally write to you about your work account? A break in the normal pattern is a reason to slow down, not a reason to hurry.

This is the check that catches the hardest case. When a supplier's real mailbox has been taken over, the address is genuine and authentication passes, and Microsoft notes that attackers often use a compromised mailbox to send to recipients inside and outside the organization. Only the pattern gives it away: new bank details, new urgency, a change in tone, a request nobody mentioned on the phone. Microsoft lists three more pattern breaks worth knowing, which are an email from a person or company you rarely deal with, a To line full of addresses that look random, and a signature that does not match the sending address.

Two more for the careful

Check the reply-to address, which can differ from the sender and is where your answer actually goes. And read the greeting and the signature. A supplier who has called you Dave for six years does not open with Dear Customer, and your CEO's signature does not change its phone number on a Tuesday.

The reply-to check takes five seconds. The mail standard lets a sender name a separate Reply-To address, so press Reply, read the To line before typing anything, and discard the draft if the address is not the one you expected. Microsoft also counts greetings that misuse your name, or pull it straight from your email address, as a sign of a malicious message.

Mistakes that let scams through

Watch for these habits in yourself and your team:

  • Replying to ask "is this really you?", which asks the scammer.
  • Trusting a message because it comes from a real supplier's real address.
  • Treating the External label as a verdict. It says where a message came from, not whether it is honest.
  • Assuming two-step sign-in makes it safe to type a password into a page you reached from an email.
  • Checking a request by calling the number in the signature, when that number came from the same message.

The sixty-second check in practice

Imagine a twelve-person landscape design firm. On a Thursday afternoon the office manager gets an email that appears to come from the nursery that supplies most of their plants. It says the nursery has changed banks, links to "updated remittance details" and asks that this week's $18,400 payment go to the new account because the old one closes on Friday.

In the first fifteen seconds she reads the address. The name is right, but the domain has an extra hyphen and ends in .co rather than the .com on last month's invoice. That alone settles it, but she runs the rest because the check is a habit.

The ask is a change to bank details. The pressure is the Friday deadline. Hovering over the link shows a file-sharing address with no connection to the nursery. The pattern is wrong, because in six years the nursery has never changed anything by email, and pressing Reply shows a reply-to at a free webmail account.

She does not reply, click or call the number in the message. She forwards it to the help desk as an attachment and calls the nursery on the number printed on last month's invoice. The nursery has sent no such email. The help desk finds the same message in two other inboxes, removes the copies and blocks the look-alike domain.

In the harder version, the nursery's own mailbox has been taken over, so the address is exactly right and the reply-to may match. The pattern check, and the firm's rule that bank changes need a phone call, are what save the payment.

When it fails a check

Forward it to your help desk and wait. Do not reply to it, do not click, do not call the number in the message.

If it claims to be from a colleague, call them on the number you already have. If it claims to be from a supplier, call the number on last month's invoice. A real request survives a phone call. A scam does not.

The number matters because the FBI's definition of business email compromise covers compromised phone numbers and virtual meeting apps as well as email accounts. A call you place to a number you already had is a check. A call you receive, or a number copied from the message, proves nothing.

Keep the message. Do not delete it. The headers inside it tell the help desk where it really came from and whether anyone else at the company got the same one.

Forward it as an attachment if you can, because Microsoft's instructions for reporting mailboxes warn that an ordinary forward strips required headers. In Gmail on a computer, tick the box next to the message, click More at the top, then Forward as attachment. In classic Outlook for Windows, select the message and press Ctrl+Alt+F, Microsoft's shortcut for forwarding a message as an attachment.

Nobody should feel foolish for asking. That is the point of having somewhere to ask.

If someone already clicked or paid

Speed matters more than embarrassment. Microsoft's advice for anyone who thinks they have been phished is to contact IT if it happened on a work computer, change the passwords for the affected accounts immediately, and report any fraudulent activity to the bank and credit card company.

What happens next depends on what was given away:

  • A click with nothing typed means telling the help desk which device and which link, so it can be checked.
  • A typed password means changing it at once on the real site, reached by typing the address yourself, and telling the help desk so it can sign out other sessions and look for new forwarding rules or sign-in methods.
  • A code from an authenticator app typed into the same page means the same steps, urgently, because CISA describes fake sign-in pages that collect the six-digit code along with the password.
  • Money sent by wire or ACH means calling your bank immediately to request a recall, then filing a complaint with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center that includes the full transaction details.
  • Gift cards bought and codes sent means reporting it to the gift card company right away, keeping the cards and store receipts, and telling the FTC.

For the help desk, Microsoft's guidance on a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox includes revoking active sign-in sessions, removing sign-in methods and devices the attacker added, and reviewing forwarding settings and inbox rules, including hidden ones. It also warns that resetting a password does not revoke existing app passwords.

The bank call comes first because money can sometimes be frozen before it moves on. The FBI says time is of the essence after a fraudulent transfer, and in 2025 its Recovery Asset Team, which works with banks to freeze funds, helped freeze about $679 million of roughly $1.16 billion in attempted theft, a 58 percent success rate.

What the business should have behind you

The sixty-second check is the last line. The first lines are set up once, by whoever runs your email:

  • Spam and phishing filtering turned on properly and tuned. Most businesses never switch half of it on.
  • External sender tagging, so a message from outside the company says so at the top.
  • SPF, DKIM and DMARC enforced, so receiving mail systems can refuse mail that forges your own domain.
  • Two-step sign-in on every mailbox, and a sweep for the hidden forwarding rules attackers leave behind after a break-in.
  • Rules for the gift-card and payroll-change scams specifically, because those are the two that get small businesses.

Where those settings live in Microsoft 365

Most controls sit in the Microsoft Defender portal under Email & collaboration, then Policies & rules, then Threat policies. The Preset Security Policies page there applies Microsoft's recommended settings as a package, and Microsoft's documentation says Standard protection and Strict protection are likely to be off on your first visit.

Then work through these settings:

  • Turn on a preset security policy. In its wizard, add owners, finance staff and key supplier contacts under Add email addresses to flag when impersonated by attackers, and key suppliers' domains under Add domains to flag when impersonated by attackers.
  • Expect impersonation protection only with Microsoft Defender for Office 365. The presets cover your own domains automatically, but user impersonation protection covers only the senders you add, up to 350 per policy.
  • In the anti-phishing policy, leave spoof intelligence on and turn on the first contact safety tip, as Microsoft recommends. The tip is off in the default policy and on in the Standard and Strict presets.
  • Turn on the External label that Outlook shows on outside mail, which Microsoft calls external sender identification, with the Set-ExternalInOutlook command. It can take 24 to 48 hours to appear.
  • In the outbound spam filter policy, set automatic forwarding rules to Off unless someone needs them. The default, Automatic, can behave differently from one organization to another, and Off is Microsoft's recommended Standard and Strict value.
  • In the Exchange admin center, under Mail flow, then Rules, add a rule for senders located outside the organization whose subject or body includes words such as gift card or direct deposit, and have it prepend a warning disclaimer.
  • On that rule, do not leave the fallback action at Wrap, the default, because Microsoft says it interferes with Safe Attachments scanning of outside mail and suggests Reject instead. Microsoft also recommends testing a rule before enforcing it.
  • In Settings, then Email & collaboration, then User reported settings, send what people report with the Report button to a mailbox your help desk watches. The default is the global admin's mailbox, and a message reported as phishing is deleted from the reporter's mailbox, so the copy has to reach someone who reads it.

Where those settings live in Google Workspace

In the Google Admin console, go to Apps, then Google Workspace, then Gmail, then Safety. The Spoofing and authentication section has settings that map directly onto the checks above:

  • Protect against domain spoofing based on similar domain names, which covers look-alikes of your own domains.
  • Protect against spoofing of employee names, which covers outside mail that uses a name from your company directory.
  • Protect against inbound emails spoofing your domain, and Protect against any unauthenticated emails.
  • Apply future recommended settings automatically, so new protections arrive switched on.

Each protection can keep the message in the inbox with a warning, which is the default, move it to spam, or quarantine it. Under Gmail, then End User Access, the Automatic forwarding setting is on by default, so turn it off or limit it to internal addresses unless someone needs it. Under Gmail, then Compliance, a Content compliance rule can match words such as gift card in inbound mail and prepend a warning to the subject.

On either platform, require two-step sign-in for every mailbox and prefer phishing-resistant methods. CISA says any form of multifactor authentication is better than none, but it describes fake sign-in pages that capture a password and a six-digit code together, and it calls FIDO authentication the only widely available phishing-resistant option. The FIDO Alliance describes passkeys as credentials based on FIDO standards that can be stored on a phone, a computer or a hardware security key.

Put the money rules in writing

Settings will not catch everything. For the rest, the FBI advises using a second channel to verify any request to change account information, and a one-page policy makes that call routine instead of awkward:

  • Any change to a supplier's or employee's bank details is confirmed by a call to a number already on file before anything changes.
  • Nobody buys gift cards because of an email or text, whoever it appears to come from.
  • Payments above an agreed amount need a second person's approval.
  • Supplier phone numbers are recorded when the supplier is set up, never taken from the message asking for a change.
  • Anyone can delay a payment to check it, and nobody is blamed for doing so.

Test that the protections work

A few quick tests confirm the settings are doing their job:

  • Send a message from a personal account to your work address and check that it arrives with the External label or warning your administrator chose.
  • Ask what your DMARC policy says. Under the current DMARC standard, RFC 9989, p=none expresses no preference about mail that fails, quarantine says such mail is suspicious, and reject says a failure shows the use of your domain is not valid.
  • Remember that receivers decide. Microsoft 365, for example, takes no action based on DMARC when the policy is p=none, which leaves forgeries of your domain to its other filters.
  • Ask for a list of mailboxes that forward automatically to outside addresses. Microsoft 365 has an Auto forwarded messages report for this in the Exchange admin center.
  • After adding a warning rule, send yourself messages that should and should not trigger it, which is how Microsoft suggests checking a disclaimer rule.
  • Forward a harmless message to the help desk as an attachment and confirm that a person answers.

What to do this week

None of this needs special tools:

  • Walk the team through the five checks using a recent suspicious message, without clicking anything in it.
  • Put the money rules on one page and have everyone who pays bills or runs payroll read it.
  • Keep key supplier and staff phone numbers somewhere you can reach without opening email.
  • Ask whoever runs your email which of the settings above are on, and set dates for the rest.
  • Tell everyone where suspicious messages go, and that asking is never a bother.

What ALCO does

For the mail domains we manage, the filtering built into Google Workspace and Microsoft 365 is configured and reviewed, SPF, DKIM and DMARC are published, aligned for every sender and moved to enforcement, mailboxes have two-step sign-in and alerts, and hidden forwarding rules are swept. Forward a suspicious message to the help desk and a person tells you whether it is real, usually within minutes. The help desk is staffed 24 hours a day, including holidays, and calls are answered by a person.

There are free Learning Center videos on faked email and reading headers if you want your team to see how it is done. See alcohq.com/services/email-security for the full scope.

Sixty seconds is cheap. The alternative is a wire transfer you cannot get back.

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